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ABSTRACT. This article assesses the quality of Inte-
grative Social Contracts Theory (ISCT) as a social con-
tract argument. For this purpose, it embarks on a
comparative analysis of the use of the social contract
model as a theory of political authority and as a theory of
social justice. Building on this comparison, it then
develops four criteria for any future contractarian theory
of business ethics (CBE). To apply the social contract
model properly to the domain of business ethics, it should
be: (1) self-disciplined, i.e., not aspire results beyond what
the contract model can realistically establish; (2) argu-
mentative, i.e., it should seek to provide principles that
are demonstrative results of the contractarian method; (3)
task-directed, i.e., it should be clear what the social
contract thought-experiment is intended to model; and
(4) domain-specific, i.e., the contractarian choice situa-
tion should be tailored to the defining problems of
business ethics.
KEY WORDS: contractarianism, Integrative Social
Contracts Theory, theories of business ethics
The project for an Integrative Social Contracts
Theory (ISCT) seeks to develop norms for corporate
morality on the basis of a social contract model
(Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999, 2000a, b; Dunfee,
2000). Analogous to classical contract theorists such
as Hobbes and Locke, who used the contract model
to specify conditions under which the national state
can legitimately exercise its power, ISCT seeks to
specify the conditions for socially responsible cor-
porate conduct on the basis of a social contract
model especially adapted for this purpose.
ISCT arguably is the most promising approach to
business ethics currently available. But, as will be set
out in thisarticle, ISCT can be shown to be relatively
eclectic in its rendering of the social contract argu-
ment. To make this case, we draw upon the rich
social contract tradition in the history of political
theory. Much has been written both in terms of
original political theories and of analysis in the sec-
ondary literature on that subject (Barry, 1989, 1995;
Boucher and Kelly, 1994; Daniels, 1989; Freeman,
1990; Gough, 1957; Hampton, 1986, 1993; Kim-
licka, 1991, 2002; Lessnoff, 1986; McClelland, 1996;
Riley, 1982). Employing this whole body of
knowledge, we undertake a comparative analysis of
the manner in which the contract model was used in
two earlier application fields, i.e., as a theory of
political authority (notably by political theorists such
as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau) and as a theory of
social justice (by political theorists such as Ackerman,
1980; Gauthier, 1986; Nozick, 1974; Rawls, 1971,
1993, 2001; Scanlon, 1998).
This comparative analysis then suggests four
application conditions for any future contractarian
theory of business ethics (CBE). Three of these
conditions would seem to follow from the inherent
logic of the contract model and can be substantiated
from the manner in which it was employed by some
of these well-established earlier contractarians; a
fourth condition stems from the defining charac-
teristics of its new application field. To apply the
contract model properly to the domain of business
ethics, it should be: self-disciplined, i.e., it should
not aspire results beyond what the contract model
can realistically establish; argumentative, i.e., it
should primarily be used as a ‘‘moral proof proce-
dure’’ (Scanlon, 1982; Hampton, 1997, p. 135) and
should seek to provide publicly justified reasons
(D’Agostino, 1996, 2003; Gaus, 1990, 1996;
Gauthier, 1995; Rawls, 1993, 1999a, b) that are
demonstrative results of the contractarian method;
task-directed, i.e., it should be clear what the social
contract thought-experiment is intended to model;
and it should be domain-specific, i.e., the contrac-
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tarian choice situation should be tailored to the
defining problems of business ethics. These four
conditions turn out to be at once points of criticism
of ISCT, currently the dominant instance of CBE, as
well as design criteria for all future work on CBE.
We will summarize these results in the form of four
central theses.
The article is structured as follows: We will first
outline the ISCT project, consider some crucial steps
in the argument, and review some of the major
empirical and theoretical criticisms, which have been
given of this framework. We will then review the
results of a comparative analysis of the use of the
contract model in theories of political authority and
of social justice. On the basis of this comparative
analysis we will develop and discuss the four design
criteria, which need to be taken into account when
transposing the contract model to the domain of
business ethics. In the concluding section, we will
list some of the research topics flowing from this
analysis to suggest a focus for future debate.
The project for an Integrative Social
Contracts Theory (ISCT)
The leading idea of the ISCT project is to reconcile
conflicts between norms that may come about in the
context of international business or business activities
involving different occupational groups or across
economic communities. In any practice of interna-
tional business there may well arise conflicts between
(usually stricter) moral norms in the home country
of the corporation and the (generally more lenient)
standards practiced in the host country. To take a
concrete example: British American Tobacco has an
enlightened and restrictive policy on underage
smoking in their Western markets (British American
Tobacco, 2005) but this is simply not carried
through in their markets in the developing world,
such as in Kenya (Ash, 2006). This reflects first of all
a difference in the relevant national legislation,
which is much stricter in Western countries than in
Africa. But it also demonstrates that BAT sets dif-
ferent moral standards regarding the desirability of
the prevention of youthful smoking in the West and
in countries such a Kenya.
The type of conflicts between norms, which
ISCT addresses can also be seen between different
occupational groups or between economic com-
munities. Accountants, bankers, lawyers, or traders
all have their specific norms relating to the exercise
of their profession. Where different disciplines col-
laborate, profession-specific norms may come into
conflict. Another category of such conflicting norms
relates to different cultures in organizations. Big
corporations commonly have a culture of their own
which often involve a series of company-specific
norms and values. If two or more of these corpo-
rations engage in business together company-specific
value may clash.1
The important point to which ISCT draws our
attention is that the more multi-national corpora-
tions (MNC’s) work across national borders, and
the more different occupational groups intermingle,
the more likely these conflicts between commu-
nity-specific moral norms will become. In the
vocabulary of ISCT these local norms are referred
to as microsocial contracts. This name underscores
that the moral force of such a norm within an
economic community rests on the consent and
support of individual members of that community
for that norm. The principal ambition of ISCT is
to seek to adjudicate possible conflicts between
microsocial contracts originating from different
economic communities by means of identifying
universal, more fundamental principles, called hy-
pernorms.
In view of this general description of the project,
two core questions will naturally arise to any
reflective business practitioner (1) what hypernorms
are there? and (2) why would we obey them? In the
first part of this article we will analyze the structure
of the argument ISCT develops in answer to these
questions. This part is structured as follows. We will
first look into the problem-statement of the project
as a whole, explaining the reasons why ISCT must
be deemed opportune in the present world of
international business; we will then consider the
precise role the social contract device plays in the
ISCT argument; third, we look into the set up of the
ISCT thought-experiment and the terms agreed by
the contractors. Fourth, we will consider the
methodology by which hypernorms are established.
Finally, we will assess whether ISCT actually delivers
on its promise. The resulting picture of the ISCT
project will serve as a point of departure for our
inquiry into design criteria for CBE.
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ISCT’s problem-statement
Donaldson and Dunfee provide various reasons
justifying their project. For present purposes, we will
focus on two of these justifications, a general and a
more detailed one. The most general problem-
statement for the introduction of the ISCT frame-
work can be seen from the two examples with
which the project is introduced in their book. These
are both taken from the business practice of Royal/
Dutch Shell and involve their dispute with the
Ogoni, an indigenous people living in the Niger
Delta; and the bad publicity over the Brent Spar
affair (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999, pp. 1–9).
The justification stemming from the Shell–Ogoni
example is purely in promissory terms: the thrust of
this argument is that problems arising in present-day
international business are so complex and unique
that we need some new, special technology to
resolve them (1999, p. 3). The ISCT model pur-
portedly is going to perform this function.
The second justification digs a level deeper,
however. In addition to emphasizing the complexity
of modern international business, it also provides an
indication of why the current state of business ethics
theory-building is insufficiently equipped to guide
the practitioners. In this respect, ISCT seeks to im-
prove upon currently available ethical theories, such
as Kantianism, utilitarianism, virtue ethics or the
stakeholder model. By their very nature, these
general ethical theories are incapable ever to rise
above a ‘‘view from nowhere’’. This second justifi-
cation proceeds in three steps and comprises a pro-
blematization of the present state of business ethics
theories, a more specific diagnosis, and the presen-
tation of the ISCT-framework as a natural remedy.
By way of problematization of the present state of
business ethics theory-building the authors of ISCT
point out that
No single theory has emerged that is fully capable of
providing guidance about the gamut of challenging
business ethics matters … For want of a usable theory,
many academics … have turned to the pivotal tradi-
tions of ethical theory – in other words, to the broad
normative theories of consequentialism, virtue ethics,
Kantian deontology, and pragmatism. … Yet, none of
these philosophically inspired attempts has been fully
satisfactory. What has gone wrong? Why has no one
been able to use these singly or in combination, to
establish a single, generally accepted paradigm in
business ethics? (1999, pp. 12–13).
The accompanying diagnosis then runs as follows
We believe the difficulty of such approaches lies lar-
gely in their imprecision. As sometimes happens when
grand, broadly drawn theories are applied to specific
issues, the results are blurry.… the pivotal traditions of
ethical theory, when applied in undiluted form to real-
world problems, have offered a ‘view from nowhere.’
They have been incapable of locating the complex,
particular problems of corporations, industries, eco-
nomic systems, marketing strategies, etc., in a way that
would provide an institutional ‘somewhere.’ (1999,
p. 13)
The third step in the argument then introduces
ISCT as a remedy which aspires to bridge the gap
between the sterile universalism of ‘‘the view from
nowhere’’ and the danger of relativism which always
accompanies too much particularism. So it will be
helpful to now consider the role of the (macrosocial)
contract argument in the ISCT project as compared
to its function in other contractarian theories.
The role of the contract argument
The social contract model generally functions as a
framework for justification in ethics. The idea here is
that the legitimacy of social rules and institutions
depends on their being freely and publicly acceptable
to all individuals bound by them. If rational indi-
viduals in appropriately defined circumstances could
or would agree to certain rules or institutions, then
insofar as we identify with these individuals and their
interests, what they accept should also be acceptable
to us here and now as a basis for our cooperation.
But in the conceptual machinery of the ISCT
framework this general idea is elaborated in two
entirely different senses. Alongside microsocial con-
tracts, which we already came across, the authors
also distinguish a macrosocial contract. Microsocial
contracts, which are characteristically discussed in the
plural, refer to the set of ‘‘extant, actual agreements
existing within and among industries, national eco-
nomic systems, corporations, trade associations, and
so on’’ (1999, p. 19). The social contract device
serves here as a source of normativity for the various
community-specific norms. Within the boundaries
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of the community, these norms have normative force
because a sufficient number of individual members
subscribe to them. On the other hand, the macro-
social contract stands for the hypothetical style of
contracting by means of a thought-experiment in the
manner of some well-established social contract
theories. It refers to ‘‘broad, hypothetical agreements
among rational people. Such contracts are designed
to establish objective background standards for social
interaction’’ (Ibid.).
In addition to these two types of social contracts,
the authors also distinguish three types of hyper-
norms: procedural, structural, and substantive
(1999, p. 53). Procedural hypernorms refer to the
preconditions of exit and voice, which are required
to establish authentic local norms; structural
hypernorms deal with organizing all matters nec-
essary for the organization of the economic com-
munity, irrespective of any specific preferences of
individual members; whereas substantive hyper-
norms serve directly to accommodate conflicting
community-specific norms. The point to observe
here is that only the first two categories of hyper-
norms result from the thought-experiment and the
ensuing agreement of the contractors to the mac-
rosocial contract. But the substantive hypernorms,
the type of principle, which does the real work in
the ISCT framework, can be discovered by anyone
who goes to the trouble of surveying the relevant
evidence. Substantive hypernorms therefore do not
so much result from the contract, but they are to
be recognized, not only by the contractors, but also
by you and me. If we may take recognition to be a
weaker form of agreement than rational consent,
this distinction, therefore tends to loosen the
connection between the substantive hypernorms
and the macrosocial contract. It renders the func-
tion of the macrosocial contract less prominent
within the conceptual machinery of ISCT. As far as
the identification of substantive hypernorms is
concerned we can do without the macrosocial
contract.2
The set up of the ISCT thought-experiment
We shall now consider the manner in which ISCT
models the initial contractual situation. We saw that
the core of all contractarian approaches consists in
the idea that all parties involved in the social contract
would voluntarily agree to whatever the terms of the
contract are. In most varieties this is treated as
hypothetical, not actual agreement: addressees of the
contract are bound by its terms because, situated in
certain relevant conditions, it would be rational or
beneficial for them to do so. Any social contract
theory properly so called must therefore give some
characterization of (1) the parties to the contract; (2)
the situation in which they find themselves when
concluding the contract, variously called ‘‘state of
nature’’ or ‘‘original position;’’ (3) the common
purpose which they seek to establish by means of the
contract; and (4) their rationality and motivation to
come to agreement.
On the question as to who exactly are party to the
contract (and hence who should feel obliged by its
terms) Donaldson and Dunfee remain relatively
general. They refer to ‘‘a diverse set of imaginary
contractors (…) who represent the varied attitudes of
the modern world’’ (1999, p. 26). But the real
question is whether the fact that the contractors are
supposed to represent us amounts to a sufficient
source for normativity. Why should their choice
justify our adopting of the terms of the contract?
(Daniels, 1989, p. xxxix, summarizing a point made
by Nagel and Dworkin). Similarly, there is hardly
any description of the pre-contractual choice situa-
tion offered by the authors of ISCT, while it is clear
that the force of the contract argument crucially
depends on the alternatives between which the
contractors can choose and the background condi-
tions against which contractors deliberate to get to
agreement. Nor is there any specific purpose which
the contract is supposed to bring about, apart from
the rather general idea of ‘providing guidance about
the gamut of challenging business ethics matters’
which emerged in the course of ISCT’s problem-
statement.
In fact, of the four categories of parameters of
the collective choice situation mentioned above,
Donaldson and Dunfee are most specific on the
motivational assumptions of the contractors
(1999, p. 26–36). These start with the idea of an
undetermined mix of contractor preferences, in which
some are greed driven, some altruistic, but most are
simply somewhere in between these two. Contrac-
tors are bounded in their capacity for moral ratio-
nality and are only partially knowledgeable about
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their status in the economic morality created by the
contract. They are ignorant of their economic
community and do not know their personal wealth.
But they have settled understandings of deep moral
values, which are used as ingredients for the moral
norms the contract will sanction.
The terms of the macrosocial contract
Having thus characterized the contractarian choice
situation, Donaldson and Dunfee go on to argue that
contractors will agree upon a procedural model of
four steps with which ISCT can be given its moral
content (1999, p. 36–47). The suggestion here is that
these four steps flow from consensus among con-
tractors. Economic communities will be left as much
‘‘moral free space’’ to organize themselves as is
possible without interfering with other communi-
ties. To the extent that these local norms are sup-
ported by a clear majority of the constituency and
the preconditions of exit and voice are met,
microsocial contracts can be seen as authentic norms.
Where authentic norms conflict with the authentic
norms of other communities, a balance must be
struck on the basis of the more universal hyper-
norms, so as to decide which local norm should
prevail. Fourth, if this weighing fails to adjudicate
the conflicting norms, the ISCT framework provides
for a set of rules of thumb so that conflicts can be
eliminated according to the spirit of the contract.
Unfortunately, there is no logical link between
the characteristics of the choice situation and the
procedure for the accommodation of possible con-
flicts between community-specific norms. As set, the
parameters simply do not warrant the conclusions
drawn by the authors. The suggestion that an ori-
ginal position consisting of ‘‘a diverse set of imagi-
nary contractors’’ motivated by ‘‘an undetermined
mix of contractor preferences’’ would somehow
naturally – let alone necessarily – produce unani-
mous consent on the four procedural rules specified
by the authors, just does not follow. By the same
token, one could make a plea for any other
‘reasonable’ principle. But such a plea would need
no social contract thought-experiment.
There are, therefore, two crucial reasons why the
social contract argument does not fulfill its proper
function in the ISCT set up. First, the macrosocial
contract is not used to derive the most important
category of hypernorms. And second, to the extent
that an accommodation procedure for conflicting
microsocial contract is agreed upon, this is less than
logically compelling.
Identifying substantive hypernorms
On the basis of the procedure sketched above, the
authors of ISCT proceed to establish the moral
content generated by the ISCT framework. For the
purposes of the present text it is especially useful to
consider the manner in which substantive hyper-
norms are identified (step 3 in the model) and how
they can be regarded to actually accommodate
conflicting community-specific local norms (the
intended result of the procedure). If substantive
hypernorms do not result from the contract, how are
they established?
The method of identifying substantive hyper-
norms proceeds on a case-based approach. As the
authors assert: ‘‘Although hypernorms are universals,
they will of necessity be identified and interpreted
from the vantage point of a particular decision
within a particular cultural environment’’ (1999,
p. 9). These decisions must be taken in view of
whether there is a relevant hypernorm for the case
‘‘prohibiting, affirming or circumscribing potential
courses of action’’ (Ibid.). The method of proof
consists in collecting evidence supporting such hy-
pernorms, which must then be weighed against
possible counter-evidence denying the existence of
such a hypernorm. The authors mention 11 possible
sources from which such evidence can originate
(1999, p. 60), but it is clear that this should not be
seen as an exhaustive enumeration. Any other con-
vincing evidence can certainly also be brought to
bear. Alongside these sources they also mention
three possible sources for counter-evidence to refute
any presumptive hypernorms (1999, p. 60–1). A
positive balance between supporting evidence and
counter-evidence would lead one to make a
‘‘rebuttable presumption’’ that there is a hypernorm
covering the particular decision.
In order to see how this working method is
envisaged in the ISCT project it is helpful to see
how the authors proceed in dealing with the four
sample cases in their book, i.e., bribery, gender
discrimination, workplace safety, and ethics in
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marketing research. The first three examples have an
international dimension, the issue of ethics in mar-
keting research is set in a national context. Signifi-
cantly, the empirical evidence collected for first
three examples leads the authors to conclude that a
presumptive hypernorm can be identified. Only in
the case of deception in marketing research the
evidence leads them to presume that there is no
hypernorm allowing for such practice.
The first case is tested from the perspective of a
manager for an airplane manufacturer who is con-
sidering a payment of $5 million to go personally to
the Minister of Defense of a developing country.
The evidence against such payments is derived from
guidelines issued by organizations such as Trans-
parency International, the OECD, the OAS, busi-
ness codes such as the Caux Principles, laws in
numerous countries, the opinions of leaders of major
accounting firms, major religions, and major phi-
losophies. All these sources support a presumption
that bribe-giving would violate a hypernorm. Pos-
sible counter-evidence extenuating this practice may
be found in the fact that there is a widespread
acceptance of making payments of this type to gain
jobs and enhance profits. But, the authors conclude,
this counter-evidence would not be sufficient to
overcome the presumptive hypernorm.
The issue of international gender discrimination is
inquired from the case of a global express delivery
firm, which must decide whether to assign women
to drive a van in Saudi Arabia, a country which has
customary norms prohibiting women from driving
based upon interpretations of Islamic sources.
Evidence against this selective type of gender
discrimination is collected from the United Nations,
the ILO, national laws of many countries, as well as
major philosophies and religions. Adding up this
evidence appears to meet the standard establishing a
presumptive hypernorms against this practice.
Possible counter-evidence may be found in the fact
that the Saudi norm is based upon a religious
interpretation; but then, the authors concede, this
understanding is not shared by the vast majority
of other Muslim countries. So, again, the –
presumptive – conclusion is that there is a covering
hypernorm for this case.
The issue of international workplace safety is
illustrated from the case of a global chemical firm,
which requires its workers around the world to wear
helmets when overhead cranes are operating in the
vicinity. Since workers in Korea protested against
the helmets, the local manager decided to waive the
helmet requirement. On the basis of ILO standards,
major religious and philosophical precepts the
authors conclude in this case that a presumptive
hypernorm requiring feasible workplace safety
practices is essential to protect the workers against
serious physical injury. Although local norms do not
require helmets and the workers themselves prefer
comfort over safety, these objections do not appear
sufficiently strong to overcome the presumption.
The one counter-example discussed in the book
relates to a dilemma arising in the context of market
research. Gathering information about their clients’
products, a marketing research firm tells their
interviewees that they are conducting an indepen-
dent consumer survey. In this case another balance is
struck. Against the practice pleads the general prin-
ciple of truth-telling, which is supported by many
religions, philosophies and laws, as well as in state-
ments of proper business behavior made by many
types of organizations. But in this case, the authors
conclude that none of these rules are specific enough
to apply to the question of whether one needs to
volunteer information in this type of interaction.
This process of identifying substantive hyper-
norms is ‘‘relatively easy and non-controversial,’’ say
Donaldson and Dunfee (1999, p. 63). But even in
these four examples there may be more problems
than the authors suggest. First, none of the examples
employs a clear decision criterion for the establish-
ment of a presumptive hypernorm. As Hartman et
al. comment, in the context of an inquiry into
hypernorms relating to international labor standards,
‘‘how many hits are needed [for a norm] to be
considered a hypernorm?’’ (2003, p. 208). If we are
to count the pieces of evidence supporting a possible
hypernorm, all sources must carry equal weight as if
they were values on a nominal scale. And more
importantly: how can we weigh the evidence for
and against? It would seem as if this is just loosely
weighed on one’s hand, rendering an intuitive
judgment and an immediate outcome. And this
suggests that we are dealing with an appeal to
common sense by way of a decision procedure. The
question what hypernorms can be arrived at on the
basis of this procedure thus remains tantalizingly
open.
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Does ISCT deliver?
Having considered some of the pitfalls of ISCT as a
social contract theory, we may now return to the
question as to what extent ISCT actually succeeds in
delivering on its promise to provide more concrete
practical guidance. If push comes to shove the
authors just draw conclusions on the four concrete
examples just discussed, but even in these cases the
actual contents of the covering hypernorm is not
specified. That would otherwise be difficult on the
basis of a single case, unless the covering hypernorm
takes the form ‘‘it is forbidden to pay bribes’’ or
something along these lines. The authors moreover
indicate that the covering hypernorms, which are
found in this manner, have a presumptive status, i.e.,
they can always be refuted again if the balance of the
evidence for and against changes. While this may
look like, and is in fact praised as an attractive and
flexible procedure (1999, p. 74), it is unlikely to
promote the tangibility of the idea of substantive
hypernorms.
It is no surprise, therefore, that several commen-
tators have criticized ISCT for the lack of more
concrete substantive hypernorms (Rowan, 1997,
2001; Soule, 2002; Hartman et al., 2003; Van
Oosterhout et al., 2006). But in spite of these
exhortations, Donaldson and Dunfee have so far
declined to provide a list of substantive hypernorms,
pointing out that
more precise definition of the issue, stemming from
the process in which one first identifies the ethical
decision and then seeks to identify relevant hyper-
norms, is more likely to produce results than a top-
down analysis in which a simple, preexisting ‘definitive
list’ list of hypernorms is used with deductive reason-
ing. (1999, p. 75).3
This presumably also means that Donaldson and
Dunfee consider the compilation of a list of hy-
pernorms to be a task for the community of busi-
ness ethics scholars, and not merely a task resting
on their shoulders. But, at least for the time being,
it undermines ISCT’s initial claim to be able to
provide better practical guidance than the ‘‘pivotal’’
general theories. It is the combination of this claim
and its omission not to come up with more con-
crete substantive hypernorms, which leads us to the
conclusion that – as it presently stands – ISCT does
not deliver. The question as to how we can do
better, therefore imposes itself with some force.
One suggestion would be to simply carry on with
the work of identifying more substantive hyper-
norms following the four examples set out in the
book so as to come to some system of substantive
hypernorms. But in view of the inquiry above
demonstrating that ISCT made only a limited use
of the potential of the social contract argument, it is
tempting to look into another possibility, i.e., of
upgrading the theory to a full-blown social contract
argument. In order to prepare the way for such an
upgrade, the second part of this essay will sketch
four design criteria, which should be taken into
account in elaborating a better CBE.
Design criteria for CBE
ISCT was extensively criticized and commented
upon, including in papers published in this journal
(Calton, 2006; Douglas, 2000; Fort, 2000; Husted,
1999; Phillips and Johnson-Cramer, 2006). To
attempt any exhaustive review would simply be
beyond the scope of this article. But there is one
point, which was not raised in any other of the
numerous commentaries. This involves a diagnosis as
to why the authors did not get the ISCT project
afloat. The suggestion here is that most problems of
ISCT can be traced to a misunderstanding of the
nature of the contract device as a method of argu-
ment and the manner in which it is to be properly
set up.
A robust method to retrieve hard and fast criteria
for this purpose may be found in Wempe (2004,
2005). This author has inventoried some of the more
renowned existing contract theories to see what use
was made of the contract device and divided these
into classical theories and modern theories. Classical
theories dating from the 17th and 18th centuries
used the contract device to establish the conditions
for a legitimate exercise of political authority.
Modern theories from the 20th century evoked the
contract device to formulate principles of social
justice. Table I compares the relevant qualities of
these families of social contract theories so as to
suggest an appropriate way to set up the contract
model and apply it to the domain of corporate
morality.
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The two left columns in this table list a series of
points of comparison on the basis of which the three
families of social contract theories (listed in the three
columns to the right) are being compared. These
points of comparison are grouped into four catego-
ries: external logic, internal logic, domain charac-
teristics, and theoretical assumptions made by these
various social contract theories. The external logic
refers to the parties that are being addressed and the
(practical or theoretical) aims the theorist wants to
establish or support by invoking the contract device.
Hobbes, for example, is commonly understood to
have used the contract model to combat the political
fragmentation owing to the civil wars of his times.
Hence, this is often taken to have been the practical
aim of Hobbes’ theory. But his argument may be
also used to support a strong government in any
other historical situation. Such a more indirect and
abstract usage of his particular version of the social
contract argument is referred to as the theoretical
aim of his theory. The internal logic refers more
specifically to the modeling of the pre-contractarian
choice situation. This involves the specific argu-
mentative strategy by which a theorist seeks to
convince his audience to accept the specific terms of
the social contract.
Domain characteristics are all the parameters of a
particular application field which corresponding
theories need to cater for. In this connection, Rawls
coined the useful phrase ‘‘circumstances of justice’’
to characterize the general background conditions
against which all central questions of social justice
arise. In the comparative analysis in Table I this idea
was generalized to the two other domains. Thus, we
can inquire into the circumstances of political
authority, i.e., the general backdrop against which all
questions of political authority arise. And similarly,
we can inquire into the circumstances of business
ethics, meaning the general background common to
all core questions of business ethics.
The theoretical assumptions will reflect the
manner in which the theory adapts to the domain
characteristics of its field. Each theory (or family of
theories) can be shown to proceed from certain
assumptions, which help to ensure that the theory
adequately addresses its field. The theoretical
assumptions of the three families of contract theories,
which were compared in Table I, include access,
exit and authority. An effective political authority is
assumed in modern theories and CBE, but clearly
not in classical theories, where political authority is a
result rather than an assumption. Differences in the
access and exit conditions to a community will have
impact on the manner in which each family of
theories deals with question who is to be party to the
contract. In the period of nation building of the 17th
and 18th centuries, access and exit were simply given
and unproblematic, so that these assumptions are
irrelevant for classical social contract theories. Rawls
(1971) restricts his analysis to domestic society,
interpreted as a closed system. The conditions of
access and exit were, therefore, deliberately kept out
of the perspective adopted by modern social contract
theories.4 For CBE, on the other hand, the condi-
tions of access and exit would seem highly relevant.
Questions relating to access and exit of stakeholders
must be counted among the defining problems of
business ethics.
Wempe used this comparative analysis as a
framework to argue for the optimal use of the
contract model across the three families of contract
theories. But the very same framework may also be
used to identify some more general boundary con-
ditions for CBE, as is indicated in Table II.
The comparative analysis of the two families of
established social contract theories suggests a number
of main criticisms of current CBE, which can in turn
be stated in the form of design criteria for any future
CBE, as the elements of an architect’s program of
demands. These criteria may be seen as boundary
conditions for a well-formed CBE and will be
discussed as the criteria of self-disciplinedness, ar-
gumentativity, task-directedness and domain-speci-
ficity, respectively. The idea that most established
social contract theories pursue some theoretical or
practical aim bears on the question as to what can
realistically be expected from a social contract
argument. This will be elaborated below as the
criterion of self-disciplinedness.
The idea that each well-formed social contract
theory proceeds on some kind of problem–solution
frame, by which the author seeks to point out to his
audience why the particular terms of the contract are
logically compelling for the contractors, is naturally
related to the criterion of the argumentativity of a
contract theory. The specific function of the mod-
eling of the contractual choice situation is to allow
the theorist to design this choice in such a way that it
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produces the intended results. It may be that the
theorist wants to screen some background factors,
which would interfere with his purposes. Rawls, for
example, designs his social contract thought exper-
iment to neutralize the impact of talents in the
negotiation process among contractors, as he be-
lieves differences in talent ought not to have moral
consequences in the distribution of the cooperative
surplus. In Table II this is incorporated in the
criterion of task-directedness.
The general significance of domain characteris-
tics and theoretical assumptions of any specific so-
cial contract theory is that one cannot expect the
very same contract model operative in one domain
(like political theory) to perform functions in
another domain (like business ethics). To be
effective, the contract model must be domain-
specific. Classical political social contract theories
operate under a specific set of domain characteris-
tics and specific theoretical assumptions, and so do
modern social contract theories and CBE. It seems
unwarranted, therefore, to expect the Hobbesian
framework to say something useful about the
dilemma’s of business ethics. If it did, this would be
purely coincidental.
Self-disciplinedness
The idea of self-discipline serves to remind us that,
when applied to either of these two earlier domains,
the contract model was characteristically used to
establish some general principles, which could help
to regulate conflicting demands among citizens of a
political community. In the case of classical social
contract theories, the contract was used to specify
the conditions of legitimate political authority, but
not any concrete legislation. These theories were
‘‘less concerned with the content of law than with
correctly identifying the person who was entitled to
legislate, and most social contract thinkers were in
fact quite conservative about the content of the law’’
(McClelland, 1996, p. 176).
Similarly, modern contract theories of social jus-
tice used the contract to work out a set of general
principles in terms of which existing basic institu-
tions could be evaluated. Rawls, for example,
specifies two general principles for the basic structure
but he leaves the content of the laws to be
established in the legislative stage, where the contract
model no longer has a part to play (1971, pp. 195–
201; 1993, p. 338). For that reason, the suggestion
we derive from the comparative analysis of the
workings of the contract model in these two earlier
domains is that the social contract for business should
also be restricted to establishing general principles
rather than concrete solutions to practical problems.
In the ISCT project, however, the contract seems
to be invoked to establish some fairly concrete re-
sults. As we saw above, the authors intentionally
proceed from individual cases and decide in each
individual case whether a covering hypernorm
applies. An interesting observation at this point is
that many of the commentaries on ISCT are critical
of Donaldson and Dunfee’s reluctance to provide
more examples of substantive hypernorms. Some of
this criticism was already prompted by the three
foundational articles expounding the ISCT frame-
work5 to which Donaldson and Dunfee then replied
in the definite statement of their doctrine (1999,
p. 74–81). That answer again provoked criticism by
other scholars (Rowan, 2001; Soule, 2002; Hartman
et al., 2003). For example, Mayer and Cava (1995)
sought to employ the ISCT framework to the
problem of international gender discrimination to
conclude that it tries to steer a non-salient course in
between a rationalist and an empiricist method of
proof.6 Husted (1999) also signaled problems in the
application of the empirical methods used by the
ISCT project which he illustrates on the basis of
discriminatory practices in Mexico. Rowan (1997,
2001) concluded that failure to specify more con-
crete hypernorms is at odds with the promise to
attend issues of business ethics more adequately than
the extant general ethical theories. The very least
ISCT would need to do would be to put together a
‘‘formalized partial list’’ (Rowan, 2001, p. 386).
Soule also states that the ISCT project as set out in
the 1999 book offers insufficient practical guidance.
If informed scholars already disagree on the identi-
fication of hypernorms, it is just not realistic to
expect managers to do so. Second, he compares
ISCT with the project of Rawls, pointing out that
this influential political philosopher would have
done only half of his job had he not specified his two
principles of justice. Like Rawls, Donaldson and
Dunfee ought to make their project complete by
providing ‘‘a few good managerial principles’’
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(Soule, 2002, pp. 118–119). Hartman et al. seek to
apply the ISCT framework to the issue of global
labor standards and conclude that it is capable of
supporting universal labor rights, such as the rights to
life and freedom of slavery, but it does not provide
sufficient guidance for the more context-embedded
‘‘relative’’ rights such as the minimal level of safety
consistent with a particular culture specific condi-
tions (2003, pp. 208–210).
All these commentators, therefore, seem keen on
making more concrete the practical significance of the
ISCT framework. But if the idea of a self-disciplined
CBE is sound, this would suggest that a more real-
istic way in which the contract model for business
can provide practical guidance is along the lines of
establishing ‘‘mid-level bridging principles’’ (Bayles,
1984) or the model of specification elaborated by
Richardson (1990) rather than to seek to resolve
concrete policy issues, such as are at stake in the
examples discussed by the authors and their critics.7
This point is summarized in our first central
thesis.
Thesis 1: The criterion of self-disciplinedness chal-
lenges much of the current criticism of the ISCT
project, which encourages the authors to elaborate
more concrete hypernorms so as to provide practical
guidance. If we take the idea of a self-disciplined
CBE seriously, the authors and the critics of ISCT
may alike be shown to pursue an unrealistic idea of
what the contract model can accomplish – indeed an
unrealistic idea of applied theories more in general.
Argumentativity
Whereas the idea of self-discipline suggests that the
social contract model should be used restrictively,
the criterion of argumentativity reminds us that, in
the hands of the ‘‘great’’ political theorists (Curtis,
1961), the contract model was typically used in an
argumentative, and not merely in a stipulative fash-
ion. The contract model can be used in a loose or a
rather more strict sense. Perhaps, the loosest rendi-
tion of the contract argument would be to interpret
it merely as an analogy. In this sense one could
consider political obligations of citizens towards the
state as if they were based on a contract. Classical
social contracts were typically used in such a
hypothetical sense. But it is precisely this hypo-
thetical character of the contract argument, which
makes it imperative for these theorists to argue why,
given the conditions of the state of nature, certain
obligations ought to be enforced, rather than others.
Failing any such specific reasons the contract model
would actually be reduced to a device for stipulating
norms or guidelines the theorist thinks to be
appropriate. Now, everyone is of course free to
employ the contract argument in such a fashion. Our
argument here is that only in its argumentative form
the contract model does generate genuine added
value. In its stipulative form the contract model
would not contribute anything essential beyond the
contract metaphor.
To make optimal use of the social contract model,
it must be used as a ‘‘moral proof procedure’’
(Scanlon, quoted in Hampton, 1997, p. 135). That is
to say, the contract must somehow render intelligi-
ble why the terms of the contract deserve to be
subscribed by the contractors, and hence why they
deserve to be adopted by the audience, which the
contract theorist addresses. Moreover, these con-
tractual terms must be based on reasons to which all
interested parties are (or should be) susceptible, a
condition which is discussed in the literature on the
contractarian method as public justification or free
public reason (Ackerman, 1980; D’Agostino, 1996,
2003; Gaus, 1990, 1996; Gauthier, 1986, 1995;
Habermas, 1990; Rawls, 1993).
The idea of argumentativity can clearly be seen
from established classical and modern contract the-
ories. Hobbes’ version of the social contract, for
example, proceeds from a demonstration to all
rational individuals (as characterized in part I of
Leviathan) that it would be to everyone’s benefit if all
were to transfer their individual rights under the law
of Nature to a sovereign. Similarly, the argument-
ativity of Rawls’s project consists in his working
method to deductively8 derive the famous principles
of his doctrine of ‘‘justice as fairness.’’ His social
contract model sought to specify the principles for a
system of public reasons within which individuals
can justify their pursuits to one another consistent
with their self-conception as free and equal persons.
Proceeding from some weak premises about human
nature9 and about the choice situation of the con-
tractors, the thought-experiment must render intel-
ligible why his famous principles of equal political
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liberty, equal opportunity and the difference prin-
ciple will be chosen.
As was explained in the discussion of the set up of
its initial contractual situation, the argumentativity of
the ISCT project is less than logically compelling.
The ISCT thought-experiment does not warrant the
resulting procedural model. Given the parameters as
set, it is not at all clear why the contractors would
opt for these four steps. And, more importantly, we
saw that the social contract model turned out to be
superfluous for the identification of the most
important category of hypernorms, i.e., substantive
hypernorms.
The implications for CBE can be summarized in a
further central thesis.
Thesis 2: The contract model has had its best results
if used as a ‘‘moral proof procedure.’’ To set up a
compelling proof, it must provide publicly justified
reasons, which are to be derived as demonstrative
results of the contractarian method.
Task-directedness
The third insight we derive from the comparative
analysis in Table II is labeled the criterion of task-
directedness. This is based on the observation that, in
the more successful examples of the use of the social
contract model, theorists always appear to work on
the basis of a fairly precise task the contract is sup-
posed to fulfill. All classical social contract theories of
lasting value were intending to drive home a certain
counter-intuitive conclusion. In general, this was the
conclusion that rational individuals would be better
off establishing the proposed form of political
authority. The contract served to resolve the prob-
lem of collective action inherent in the organization
of a political community, thereby bridging the
opposition between individual and collective ratio-
nality.10 Viewed from a purely individual perspec-
tive it is never attractive to give up the natural rights
one enjoys under the state of nature. It is only
through the contract perspective that the specific
solutions defended by Hobbes or Locke can be
justified to individual agents.11
With modern social contract theories, the con-
tract model served to provide a more solid founda-
tion to certain intuitive judgments about social
justice. This can again be illustrated from Rawls’
theory. Most people will intuitively subscribe to the
view that effort should be rewarded in the distri-
bution of the cooperative surplus. We can justify that
people who work hard will be rewarded better than
people who are born tired. Most people will also
subscribe to the view that advantages, which are
purely based on one’s social background, gender or
race, ought not to be rewarded. But not everyone
will be convinced directly that the same also applies
to talents. Yet, according to Rawls, advantages,
which are purely based on talents, ought not to be
taken into account when dividing the cooperative
surplus. The compelling reason he provides for this
point of view is that, like race, class and gender,
talent is not something the individual agent can
influence. In this example, the thought-experiment
of the social contract thus helps to bring out more
clearly some implications concerning our intuitive
ideas about social justice, which by themselves may
be less self-evident. The idea of an original position
helps, as Rawls says, to ‘‘extract the consequences’’
of our notion of fairness (1971, p. 21). It seems
evident that if we want to find proper employment
for the contract argument in the context of business
ethics we should be clear about what we want to
establish before we can start modeling.
Of course, the ISCT proposal would seem to
suggest an obvious candidate for such a task. This
would be the idea to resolve conflicting norms in the
context of international business, as was explained in
part one of this article. But the point is that the
problem of ‘‘conflicting norms’’ cannot be resolved
in general. What the social contract model could
contribute are leading principles, which could help
to conceptualize the more concrete questions. So the
challenge is to become more concrete than the
ambition to resolve ‘‘conflicting norms’’ in general,
but not so concrete as to descend to the level of
resolving individual cases as in the four examples of
substantive hypernorms provided by ISCT.
What could be possible tasks, which the social
contract model could perform for us within the
domain of business ethics? A workable compromise
between the demands of self-disciplinedness and
task-directedness may be the question as to which
parties must be considered legitimate discussion
partners. Applied to the Shell–Ogoni example this
would imply the question whether the Ogoni must
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be regarded as a legitimate talking partner for Shell.
Another example of an appropriate mid-level ques-
tion would be: what would a reasonable share in the
net result of this business engagement? (Wheeler et
al., 2002).
We have sufficiently explained (under the head-
ing of the self-disciplinedness criterion) that it would
not be realistic to expect to be able to calculate a
percentage of the profits, but a well-defined task
would need to provide the necessary information to
model the initial contractual situation so that we can
formulate principles which would help to better
conceptualize this distributive question.
This result can be summarized as follows.
Thesis 3: To apply the social contract model suc-
cessfully to the domain of business ethics we need to
establish beforehand what function it should fulfill,
so as to model the initial contractual situation
accordingly.
Domain-specificity
The fourth and final insight, which can be derived
from the comparative analysis in Table II concerns
the fact that the contract model needs to be properly
adapted to the domain to which it is applied. This
insight goes under the label of domain-specificity. In
the more renowned theories, the contract model was
accurately focused on the appropriate domain char-
acteristics. Classical social contract theories were able
to allow relatively many degrees of freedom. The
only hard criterion for a well-formed political con-
tract was that the state-perspective was made more
attractive than the pre-state perspective. It follows
from this relatively open structure that more than
one solutions fulfill this relatively light condition.
Or, to put the same point in different words:
according as the state of nature perspective was
painted more grimly, the theorist could afford a less
attractive political perspective. By itself, Hobbes’
Leviathan does not at all look appealing, but it still is
attractive as compared to the horrors of the state of
nature. Similarly, Rousseau also has a relatively
negative image of the state of nature, which corre-
sponds to a relatively absolutist sketch of political
authority.
As compared to the relatively coarse-grained
argumentation of the various classical theories,
modern social contract theories were much more
precise. One might say that according as the aims
these theories sought to establish became more
ambitious, the set of instruments also had to be more
refined. For classical social contract theories it was
sufficient to argue that the establishment of political
authority was advantageous to everyone when
compared to the non-cooperative baseline (as in the
state of nature) to arrive at a conclusion about its
legitimacy. Modern social contract theories had to
evoke far more fine-grained arguments to establish
the conditions for a fair distribution of the cooper-
ative surplus.
In the case of CBE, the contract model also needs
to be fine-tuned to the domain to which it is
applied. Defining issues of business ethics are set
against the backdrop of collective production aimed
at the creation of added value. These activities pre-
suppose the establishment of an effective political
authority to see to it that contractual obligations are
honored and to sanction promises made. Typical
issues for business ethics arise out of the attempt to
weigh interests reaching beyond national borders
and hence not covered by domestic laws. Typical
issues for business ethics moreover involve consid-
erations beyond economic calculus. The options of
access and exit to the community, which CBE
addresses, are entirely different from the access and
exit conditions of the other domains.
It may be helpful to point out that the two last
criteria, task-directedness and domain-specificity,
while intrinsically related, are nevertheless also
clearly distinct. The argument from domain-speci-
ficity has a wider reach and is intended as a warning
for aspirant CBE theories not to rely on too direct
copies of the contract model imported from other
domains. This may be seen, for example, from the
version of the social contract for business presented
in Donaldson (1982), which seems too directly
copied from Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, and in
Donaldson and Dunfee (1999), which is clearly
more inspired by Rawls. The argument from task-
directedness is more specific. It is also intended as a
warning for aspirant CBE theorists, but what is at
stake here is a clear idea about the aim with which
we start modeling the initial contractual situation.
The claim is that we need to know beforehand what
to model before we can get to an adequate set up of
this initial contractual situation. We already men-
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tioned an example from the domain of modern
social contract theories, i.e., Rawls’ concern about
the unwarranted impact of a morally irrelevant fea-
ture like talent in the process of establishing the
principles of a fair distribution of the cooperative
surplus. The relevant question for CBE, then, is as to
the main morally irrelevant features we would like to
exclude from the deliberations in the ‘‘state of
individual production.’’12
The results of this paragraph can be summarized
in the fourth and final thesis put forward in this
article.
Thesis 4: In order to elaborate a well-formed CBE
we need to specify the relevant differences in the
domain characteristics of business ethics as compared
to other problem fields to which the contract model
has successfully been applied, notably political
authority and social justice.
Conclusion and future research
This article has sought to draw attention to four
crucial shortcomings which can be discerned in the
application of the contract model to the domain of
business ethics, as was done in the ISCT project, the
presently dominant version of a CBE. We will
conclude this article by summarizing its mains results
and by delineating issues for future research.
A comparative analysis of the manner in which
the contract model was applied in two more estab-
lished domains served to make clear that the contract
model always works within certain application
conditions. Three of these follow from the logic of
the contract model: the ideas of self-discipline, ar-
gumentativity, and task-directedness serve to remind
us that there is something like an adequate, or even
an optimal use which can be made of the social
contract argument. The criterion of self-discipline
suggests that if the model tries to reach beyond its
natural carrying capacity, i.e., if it is employed to
defend too specific results, the contract model will
be unable to get to a sufficient level of generality. In
the same way as Rawls intended his project specif-
ically to support his particular conception of justice,
applied to the design of the basic structure of society,
business ethicists interested in the use of the contract
model should not seek to derive solutions for con-
crete policy issues from the contract, but rather a
particular conception of justice which can be used to
conceptualize the mutually exclusive claims of
competing demands by internal and external stake-
holders. Typical questions which play a role here are
as to what would constitute a fair distribution of the
cooperative surplus (which may be called the
problem of stakeholder accommodation); in what
manner and to what extent parties cooperating in the
production of economic value should take into ac-
count the interests of third parties external to their
cooperation who may nevertheless be affected by
that production under certain conditions. This is
commonly referred to as the problem of stakeholder
identification (cf. Mitchel et al., 1997; Phillips,
2003).
And the contract model must serve an argumen-
tative purpose, i.e., it must persuade its audience by
providing reasons to which the audience is suscep-
tible. In this manner, it can also be used to screen
extraneous factors from the reasoning process. For
example, it would seem just reasonable that any trade
or production, however profitable to the parties
cooperating in that trade or production, may not
harm other parties without adequate and sufficient
compensation or voice. The criterion of task-
directedness refers to the precise task to which
contractarian business ethics needs to be directed,
and what would be appropriate candidates for the
extraneous factors in the context of typical business
ethics problems for which we should be controlling.
The definite answers to these questions are not for
an individual business ethicist to decide. But it is
important that somebody should point out this
particular aspect of the methodology of the contract
model.
The fourth condition to be taken into account
when applying the contract to business ethics is that
the model must be adapted to suit the defining
problems of this field. Many characteristics of the
business ethics’ domain differ from the setting in
which classical and modern social contract theories
operated. Defining problems of business ethics reach
beyond national borders and beyond the enforceable
legal regulations. Therefore, a business ethics
equivalent of the Rawlsian idea of circumstances of
justice must be worked out by way of a sketch of the
relevant factors which give rise to the characteristic
questions of business ethics. Only if the contract
argument is set up in accordance with these condi-
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tions, it can do what it is supposed to do, i.e., help us
to shape and reflectively equilibrate our intuitions
about corporate morality.
Notes
1 See Donaldson and Dunfee (1999, p. 40) for a list
of examples of categories of possible economic commu-
nities.
2 Similar analyses were made by Boatright (2000),
Rowan (2001) and Soule (2002).
3 This is confirmed once again the rejoinder to a
series of book reviews of Ties (Donaldson and Dunfee
2000, p. 483).
4 Rawls considers the problem of international dis-
tributive justice in Rawls (1999a, b).
5 Donaldson and Dunfee (1994, 1995) and Dunfee
and Donaldson (1995). Initial criticism on the lack of
concrete substantive hypernorms was first voiced by
Mayer and Cava (1995); and later by Husted (1999) and
Hartman et al. (2002).
6 ‘‘If hypernorms are discoverable by reason and
there is clearly a hypernorm of gender equality for
work settings, the process of ethical analysis recom-
mended by ISCT seems needlessly cumbersome; …. If
hypernorms are discoverable by empirical inquiry, most
multi-national managers could safely conclude that wo-
men are largely subordinate and disadvantaged in work
settings’’ (1995, p. 258).
7 With the possible exception of Soule (2002). This
critic does not discuss ISCT’s application to any con-
crete cases, but merely calls for the formulation of ‘‘a
handful’’ of good principles which practitioners could
use’’ (2002, p. 120). The core suggestion of his paper
seems to overlap with Bayle’s argument for mid-level
bridging principles. Unfortunately, and curiously in
view of his criticism of ISCT as ‘‘lack[ing] sufficient
moral content’’ (2002, p. 114), he does not find the
space to provide even a single example of such manage-
rial principle.
8 Of course his actual manner of proceeding falls
short of this deductive ideal, as Rawlsian contractors
choose from a list of alternative doctrines (sets of princi-
ples), rather than individual principles by themselves.
(See Rawls, 2001, pp. 133–134).
9 That is, that individuals are mutually dependent,
that more is preferred to less, and that individuals are
risk aversive.
10 The idea of (a problem of) collective action refers
to the notion that individual parties sharing an interest
in a collective good (such as political authority) will not
spontaneously contribute to the realization of that col-
lective good (See Olson, 1965).
11 But, see De Jasay for a generalization of the classical
contract argument ‘‘demonstrat[ing] that there is no pub-
lic goods dilemma in Hobbes’ fatal sense’’ (1989, p. 4).
12 We use the terminology of Donaldson (1982), but
not necessarily the particular set up specified in that
version of the social contract for business.
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